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5Credit-Based Congestion Pricing: Expert 
Expectations and Guidelines for Application
Pradeep K. Gulipalli, Sukumar Kalmanje, and Kara M. Kockelman
Congestion	pricing	(CP)	ensures	 that	 travelers	recognize	 the	 true	 travel-time	costs	of	 their	 trip-
making	by	accounting	for	the	cost	of	delays	imposed	on	fellow	road	users.	Credit-based	congestion	
pricing	(CBCP)	is	a	novel	strategy	which	seeks	to	overcome	the	negative	equity	impacts	of	CP	by	
allocating	monthly	budgets	 to	eligible	 travelers	 to	spend	on	congestion	 tolls.	Previous	works	on	
CBCP	have	surveyed	public	opinion	and	examined	the	traffic	and	travel-welfare	impacts	of	an	Austin,	
Texas,	application.	This	paper	develops	the	CBCP	policy	further,	examining	expert	opinions	and	
system	cost	prediction.	Transport	economists,	toll	technology	experts,	administrators,	policymakers,	
and	commercial	 interests	were	surveyed	for	feedback	on	credit	distribution,	revenue	uses,	public	
reaction,	appropriate	technology	and	configuration,	enforcement	issues,	and	system-wide	economic,	
land	use,	and	business	impacts.	The	results	of	this	work	are	detailed	recommendations	for	CBCP	
implementation,	including	estimates	of	administrative	and	technology	costs	for	implementation	of	a	
CBCP	policy	in	the	Austin	region.
INTRODUCTION
Transportation policy development can be viewed as an objective dialogue between the public who 
are the major stakeholders, various interest groups who lobby for or against the policy, and the 
administrators who guide regional development. Also, the implementation and refinement of any 
significant transportation policy requires an understanding of the policy’s systemic impacts on traffic, 
land use, air-quality related costs and benefits, and likely stakeholder opinion. Through their expert 
opinions, transport economists, planners, and technologists can provide valuable contributions to 
the transportation policy development process. One such transportation policy in need of expert 
opinions for further development is credit-based congestion pricing (CBCP) (Kockelman and 
Kalmanje 2003). 
By ensuring that travelers recognize the true travel-time costs of their trip-making (by accounting 
for the cost of delays imposed on fellow road users), congestion pricing (CP) has proven to be an 
effective congestion management policy. Even though CP has the potential to benefit society as a 
whole, it can adversely affect certain user groups (e.g., low-income users and commuters with little 
or no work flexibility). CBCP is a congestion management policy which seeks to overcome the 
negative equity impacts of CP by allocating monthly budgets to eligible travelers in a priced region 
to spend on congestion tolls. This work sought to identify and isolate expert perspectives on CBCP 
budget allocation, equity issues, economic, land use, and business impacts, revenue uses, and toll 
collection. These were reviewed to produce recommendations for the implementation of a CBCP 
policy. Cost estimates for such a policy also are provided.
MOTIVATION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Since CBCP seeks to overcome CP’s negative equity impacts by providing travel budgets (Guiliano 
1994, Elliasson and Mattsson 2006), a closer examination of equity issues and other impacts is 
required to develop implementation guidelines. In a congested region, CP has the potential to transfer 
a great deal of money from the traveling public to toll collecting authorities. While a certain portion 
of such revenues is needed to cover the costs of a CP program (paying for items such as roadside 
detection devices, variable message signs, toll collection, and general program administration), the 
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rest arguably belongs to “the public” who paid for the road’s construction and its operation via taxes. 
Hence, such revenues should be used to compensate the users (directly or indirectly).  Of course, 
if users are compensated in proportion to how much they pay or how much they drive, there is no 
incentive to change one’s travel behavior. Paying a higher amount to users who drive more (and 
hence pay more) or have higher vehicle ownership actually provides an incentive for people to drive 
more or own more vehicles, which is not desirable.
Past research has looked into various revenue distribution strategies. For example, Small 
(1992) proposed a travel allowance for all commuters. He recommended a fixed amount per month 
per employee regardless of mode or time of travel so that CP incentives (i.e., reduced driving on 
congested roads) would not be undermined.  Taking a different approach, Parry and Bento (2001) 
recommended that income taxes be reduced to offset any CP-related labor supply restrictions. To 
offset several CP impacts, Goodwin (1989) and Small (1992) suggested combinations of revenue 
uses.
Under standard CP, few travelers may benefit sufficiently from the resulting travel time savings 
to appreciate the policy. This is particularly true in the short run due to fixed home, work, and school 
locations (see Arnott et al. 1994, Parry and Bento 2001). Though CP may have the potential to 
benefit society as a whole (i.e., Pareto improving), it can adversely affect certain user groups (e.g., 
low-income users and commuters with little or no work flexibility). Researchers have tried to address 
this issue of offsetting CP’s adverse effects while maintaining certain behavioral incentives. Gee 
and Hannemann (2002) proposed compensation for people negatively impacted by CP in the same 
“dimension” as the impact (such as free weekend parking for those less able to pay weekday tolls). 
Dial (1999) recommended always providing a “free” route, via minimum revenue CP. DeCorla-
Souza (2000) suggested toll credits for regular drivers via FAIR (Fast and Intertwined Regular) 
Lanes.  And Viegas (2001) proposed providing a certain level of “mobility rights.”
A CBCP policy, as conceived by Kockelman and Kalmanje (2003), has the potential to allay 
these equity concerns. According to the policy, every eligible traveler (e.g., every licensed driver 
living in the designated “priced region”) may be given a monthly travel budget. Those in the driving 
population who exhaust their travel budget while paying congestion tolls will pay out of pocket 
to keep driving, while those who save their travel budget can cash this out as a direct monetary 
saving. Each month’s travel allowance depends on the total revenue collected during that (or 
the previous) month.  Revenue neutrality is maintained by returning all revenues, after covering 
policy administrative costs. According to a survey reported by Kockelman and Kalmanje (2003), 
Austin, Texas, residents found such a policy to compete reasonably well with transportation policy 
alternatives.  In a different paper, Kalmanje and Kockelman (2004) predicted Austin area trip-based 
welfare impacts and land value changes under two different CBCP scenarios. They predicted CBCP 
to benefit most residents, whereas standard CP (without revenue redistribution) benefited relatively 
few. For Austin, a CBCP policy with all roads priced according to marginal delay costs was expected 
to return around 50¢ per user per day. They also predicted a small overall drop in residential property 
values when CP was imposed on all roads, and a small rise in downtown property values when 
imposing CP only on major highways. Credit-based CP could be expected to cause greater property 
value increases because of the inherent rebate.
Recognizing CBCP’s potential as a viable and equitable congestion management strategy, 
this paper explores the policy in further detail, and refines it based on opinions of transportation 
experts, policymakers, stakeholders, and special interest groups.  Authorities may wish to invest the 
revenues in a variety of ways; hence, several alternative uses for CBCP revenues have been studied. 
A thorough review of implementation costs has been undertaken and a set of implementation 
guidelines has also been developed.
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METHODOLOGY
To begin, an extensive survey of experts and special interest groups was undertaken to study and 
obtain opinions of a hypothetical regional CBCP implementation. These respondents included 
academicians and practitioners in the field of transport economics, toll technology, administration 
and policy, and commercial users of the transportation system. Four survey forms were used for 
these distinct respondent groups. Respondents were asked to predict system impacts and voice their 
concerns and suggestions for implementation. The questionnaires for the economists, policymakers, 
toll technologists and commercial users were mailed in February 2004 to 180 people, of whom 
50 responded after multiple follow-ups (including e-mails and phone calls). These included 19 
transport economists, 10 policymakers (all from Texas), nine toll technologists, and 12 commercial 
users. Based on the survey results, guidelines for CBCP implementation are suggested. Several 
enforcement issues also have been resolved, and cost estimates for CBCP toll technology, system 
operation and administration are provided for the Austin region.
RESULTS: SYNTHESIS OF EXPERT PERSPECTIVES
This synthesis of respondent perspectives first discusses the CBCP equity issues raised by the 
respondents, their initial impressions of the policy, and their suggestions to make it more effective. 
It then describes predicted economic impacts and land use changes, commercial user reactions, and 
anticipated business impacts. Respondents’ concerns over CBCP, opinions on revenue use and their 
expectations of public reaction to the policy are presented. Finally, experts’ recommendations for 
technology, dynamic pricing, and data requirements are compiled. Not all topics were answered by 
the respondents. Some statements in the following pages are suggestions of some respondents, and 
it is difficult to determine the opinions of the rest of the respondents about these suggestions. In 
such cases, it is not possible to provide descriptive statistics (proportion of respondents in favor of 
or against an idea). However, descriptive statistics on some overall opinions are provided, wherever 
appropriate, and are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on Expert Opinions about CBCP
Number of Responses  % Supporting
Clear equity benefits 12 75%
Effective and economically efficient 12 75%
Attractive features 13 85%
Land use benefits 14 86%
Positive effect on local economy 13 85%
Advocate road pricing (CBCP/others) 13 92%
Budget Allocation and Equity Issues
The transport economists expressed concern over so many possible people getting a travel budget, 
whether or not they used the priced corridors. Some did not find it fair for everyone with a driver’s 
license (e.g., high school students, people who rarely need to drive) to receive a travel budget. And 
some felt that differential budget allocations would make CBCP more of a welfare program – and 
that transportation policies are not efficient for income redistribution. 
There was a variety of feedback on issues relating to the policy’s equity. The transport economists 
considered departure time flexibility and value of time to be important factors in determining the 
policy’s benefits for any specific individual. Office workers and others having to travel during peak 
periods would be most negatively affected, while those traveling at off-peak hours would benefit 
(e.g., non-workers and industrial shift employees). Some policymakers and commercial users felt that 
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people living in certain zones could be disadvantaged since alternatives to peak-period solo driving 
are not the same in all zones. (For example, public transit does not serve all neighborhoods.)
Several transport economists suggested that low-income people traveling longer distances 
to work would be adversely affected, especially those who choose low-cost housing away from 
activity centers. So allocating an equal travel budget to everyone might leave low-income people 
less well off than before the policy was implemented. However, this depends on the number of low-
income drivers during congested periods, the number who would qualify for a travel budget, and 
the availability of alternative travel modes. A similar opinion was expressed by some policymakers 
(25%) who mentioned that current inequities (e.g., access to facilities and jobs) may be magnified 
under CBCP.  However, some respondents opposed any budget allocation that would be based on 
income. They felt that verifying income would be administratively burdensome and would create an 
opportunity for significant fraud.  All four respondent types were of the opinion that budget allocation 
per-adult-resident would benefit the presently disadvantaged while allocation per-registered-vehicle 
would reward vehicle ownership (and thus benefit the well-off).  
Economic Impacts and Land Use Changes
The majority of respondents (85%) thought that CBCP would stimulate the economy. However, 
some did not expect any noticeable changes, and a couple suggested that CBCP might actually 
dampen the economy. If the strategy is accepted by the public and resolves congestion problems, 
then it should benefit the local economy. However, an improved economy potentially could increase 
travel demand and exacerbate congestion. If capacity expansion is not required, the government 
might invest a portion of CBCP revenues elsewhere, which also could be good for the economy. 
Almost all respondents (85%) predicted more compact land development if CBCP was 
implemented, thus decreasing sprawl, while others did not expect any land use changes. They did 
expect location and travel demand shifts though: People would have an incentive to move closer 
to jobs, carpool, and travel off-peak, thus decreasing peak travel (Kalmanje and Kockelman 2004). 
Respondents expected an increase in the demand for transit-oriented development and a decrease 
in the long-run demand for additional highway capacity. Some predicted housing to become more 
centralized and employment less centralized. Respondents suggested that businesses based in the 
Central Business District (CBD) would become less attractive compared to those in suburban sites 
since accessing the CBD would become costlier1. A CP policy was expected to have impacts similar 
to that of a CBCP policy, as described above, and the extent to which these impacts differ would 
depend on the way each policy is implemented (e.g., budget allocation and pricing policies).
Commercial Users’ Perspectives and Predicted Business Impacts
While potential benefits to less congestion were expressed, most commercial users appeared 
uninterested in the benefits that their region’s transportation and distribution systems might see, 
and instead were interested in personal disadvantages from such a program (for instance, increased 
costs of solo commuting).  This response may reflect the growing reliance of businesses on other 
companies, such as shippers and couriers, for transportation and distribution.  As outsourcing of 
transportation and distribution become more ingrained in business models, incentives for timely 
delivery no longer reside so much in these commercial entities but in their shippers and couriers. 
This trend may undercut incentives that reduced congestion levels might have otherwise provided 
to many commercial users. 
Those who depend heavily on timely product and service deliveries indicated a clear willingness 
to pay a premium to guarantee such deliveries. Office-based employers were willing to support 
some congestion mitigation policies, as part of an effort to reduce regional pollution.  There was 
very little interest in subsidizing employee-related CBCP costs. A common perspective seems to be 
that employees must plan to get to work on time irrespective of where they live. Also, any flexibility 
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or company policy changes (in their respective firms) caused by CBCP would be slow to come since 
decisions regarding flex-time and toll-reimbursement ultimately would have to come from a firm’s 
corporate headquarters. Interviewed employers stressed that they already offer or are most likely 
would offer a flex-time workday option.  If customer levels increased during a certain time of day 
due to CBCP, several of the service-centered businesses said that they would change staffing hours 
to accommodate the variation in customer volumes.  
Concerns about CBCP
Respondents were asked to rank CBCP issues that most concerned them. Unranked alternatives were 
assumed to not pose a serious concern for the respondents. The major concern for most transport 
economists (50%) was the proposed uniform allocation of travel budgets to all possible roadway 
users. For example, the respondents felt that commuters, retired persons, and high school students 
have different needs and should be provided different travel budgets. Similarly, low-income people 
might be more adversely affected than high-income individuals and may need higher budgets. 
Another issue mentioned was the policy’s administrative cost burden. Privacy and technological 
feasibility did not seem to be major issues. Those with privacy concerns do not appear to trust the 
government because it would then have one’s trip information. Others were more concerned about 
political feasibility, traffic impacts, and land use impacts. Some of the economists also expressed 
concern about traffic spillovers onto non-priced streets. The policymakers brought up the issue of 
the agency that would be needed to administer such a system. Since CBCP could apply region-wide, 
its administration would extend beyond the municipal level, possibly via the power and guidance 
of Texas’ Regional Mobility Authorities and complicate revenue handling. Spillover onto some 
local streets (to avoid tolls) may adversely impact some locations, which may demand some of the 
collected revenues to improve their own infrastructure. Smaller communities beyond the region’s 
fringe may lobby for admission to the policy region, if their residents are not given travel budgets. 
Such concerns may make revenue-neutrality a difficult goal to achieve.
Alternative Revenue Uses
Transport economists were asked to rank a set of alternatives for uses of “excess revenues” from 
a CBCP implementation even though the Kockelman and Kalmanje (2003) CBCP proposal aimed 
to be revenue neutral through issuance of travel budgets. Any unranked alternatives are assumed 
to hold the lowest ranking. Most (60%) wanted such revenues to go toward maintaining existing 
infrastructure and/or to adding capacity. Next was the development of alternative modes such as 
transit.  Those who strongly favored transit (50%) were not interested in reducing gas taxes – and 
vice versa. Some respondents (20%) suggested reducing general taxes via CBCP revenues.  There 
was not much interest in using such revenues to improve air quality. 
The question of revenue use was approached cautiously by policymakers, all of whom are 
from Texas. There were references to Texas HB35882, which went into effect in September 2003 
with very specific guarantees regarding application and use of standard road tolls. The contacted 
policymakers felt that Texas toll revenues must be used to cover the construction costs of new 
transportation infrastructure, much like toll revenues from IH-30 between Dallas and Fort Worth 
were used many years ago. 
Public Response: Expert Opinions
There were concerns about the best way to propose CBCP since any restrictions on mobility are 
bound to generate controversy. A simpler policy, to start with, might find greater public acceptability. 
For example, people who are not exposed to flat tolling might not be very comfortable with a CBCP 
policy. All policymakers felt that public acceptability could be rather low despite the logic of CBCP’s 
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design and the congestion-reduction benefits the public would experience. However, the transport 
economists felt that CBCP could be more acceptable than other pricing strategies. There is some 
research and practical evidence to support that argument. Kockelman and Kalmanje (2003) found 
public support for CBCP in Austin (24.9%) to be similar to that for flat tolling (24.2%). Support for 
CBCP was higher (50%) among persons already familiar with CP.  Thus, education may be the key 
to generating popular acceptance. London is an example of increase in CP’s public acceptability 
following people’s exposure to that city’s cordon toll.
The experts were asked whether collecting non-congestion-related tolls (to finance infrastructure) 
together with CBCP might create any problems. The general response (80%) was that the public will 
need to be educated about the redistribution of congestion toll revenues (as travel budgets) versus 
the use of infrastructure tolls for roadway maintenance and improvements. Some respondents (30%) 
were apprehensive that introducing too many tolls at once might confuse the public. A suggestion 
involved replacing the gas tax with a flat toll and introducing CP in the form of off-peak and low-
use road discounts, so as to increase public acceptability. Another was that infrastructure toll was 
likely to be much larger than a simple replacement of the current gas tax. Suggestions hinted at using 
standard CP as a means of financing new infrastructure, delaying the implementation of CBCP until 
the initial investment is recovered. But, such a strategy has associated equity problems (e.g., why 
should only peak-period users be charged), and maintenance costs remain significant.
When participants were asked about the preferred pricing policy (including CBCP) for their 
region, High Occupancy Toll lanes emerged as the favorite primarily due to public acceptability 
and political feasibility. CP was also a prominent choice, but some respondents indicated that CBCP 
could be a better option considering its potential to gain greater public support. Flat tolls could 
be implemented before CBCP, so as to increase public awareness/acceptability. Other responses 
included flat tolls, managed lanes, ramp metering, FAIR lanes, parking charges and area-wide 
roadway pricing (like in London). Flat tolls on a portion of the network may prove a useful transition 
policy for CBCP across the remaining network’s principal corridors.
Electronic Toll Collection (ETC) Technology and Configuration
Toll technology experts across the U.S. responded to a series of technology and CBCP-related 
questions. Experts recommended technologies that could function over a wide range of frequencies/
protocols. Modular technologies were advocated, so that the latest modules could be incorporated 
as needed. Based on the survey responses and current ETC implementations, we recommend Radio 
Frequency (RF) tags for their easy availability and cost effectiveness. GPS was another popular 
choice considering it could become a common technology in future vehicles. However, skepticism 
existed following problems with the stability of on-board units in Germany’s truck tolling 
program, ‘TollCollect’ (TOLLROADSnews 2003). Some recommended dedicated short-range 
communications (DSRC) transponders, but an ETC company representative indicated that such 
transponders cost hundreds of dollars while new RF tags cost as little as $5-$10 each. Automated 
number plate recognition (ANPR) technology was the choice for enforcement. This technology 
uses cameras to photograph the license plates of vehicles that fail to relay usable tag identification. 
Information regarding the owners of such vehicles could be obtained from the state’s vehicle registry. 
The major problem with ANPR is some inaccuracies that require manual verification such as lack 
of plate standards, dirty and damaged plates, incorrect plate mounting, differences in vehicle design 
and plate position, and ambiguity/similarity in letters/numbers3. 
Respondents recommended placing ETC units at freeway entrances and exits unless such ramps 
are rather frequent (i.e., every two miles or less). In that case, placing antennas/readers at two to 
four mile intervals might be more cost effective. Placing antennas/readers at entrance and exit ramps 
(on an access-controlled highway) would involve fewer transactions; but, if one of the readings is 
flawed or missing, the trip record is lost. Frequent antennas (readers) involve more transactions and 
even if data from one reader is missing, those from others can be used to determine the appropriate 
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toll. The cost estimation analysis assumed that ETC units are spaced every three miles (on average) 
along freeways. Respondents felt that dynamic pricing (where tolls vary with traffic levels) can be 
implemented despite concerns over unpredictable toll levels. While marginal cost pricing (MCP) 
of roadways, as a function of traffic levels, is theoretically the best, such dynamic pricing adds 
uncertainty to travel options and may not be tenable.  Some balance between pre-determined tolls 
(by time of day) and flexible tolls may be best in practice, as done in the case of SR91 (Orange 
County Transportation Authority 2003). To increase acceptability, provision of alternative non-
priced routes and appropriate positioning of variable message signs (VMS) boards were suggested. 
Issues with User and System Data
When policymakers and toll technologists were queried about user data issues, the majority of 
policymakers (90%) seemed comfortable using vehicle license information from state records 
as needed. Some toll technologists (50%) suggested storing credit card information (so as to 
automatically replenish accounts with cash credits). Those against it (25%) cited the possibility of 
fraudulent use of such information and unease over being automatically billed for a dynamically 
priced product. Both groups also were concerned that people might not trust the government with 
their credit card information; hence, a third party might be needed for this purpose. Irrespective of 
the type of information stored, respondents (75%) felt that data storage would be very burdensome. 
For example, keeping track of the thousands of people moving into and out of the region each 
month would be “untenable.” Respondents felt that Social Security number information should 
not be needed. Respondents suggested that a customer service center would be needed to handle 
problems regarding faulty tags, incorrect billing, account information and corrections, and other 
credit dealings. 
Overall Opinion of CBCP
Many respondents (85% of transport economists, toll technologists, policymakers, and commercial 
interests) expressed concern over the level of administrative costs needed for a CBCP policy 
implementation. Transport economists extended support for CBCP since it employs market signals 
(prices) to allocate scarce resources (highway capacity) resulting in more effective infrastructure 
use. A majority of experts agreed that CBCP is more effective than flat tolling and normal CP. All 
policymakers that responded to the survey felt that CBCP would ease traffic congestion in their 
regions. Many acknowledged that user fees are becoming increasingly common in municipal and 
state operations. Several transport economists seemed comfortable with the policy and its equity 
implications. Commercial users seemed to appreciate the policy for its contribution to more reliable 
travel times. The responses from toll technologists suggest that CBCP is technologically viable. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION
Based on all expert responses, the results of a prior survey work (Kocklemman and Kalmanje 
2003) and thoughtful consideration of all reasonable policy options, a set of guidelines have 
been developed for CBCP application. These address issues pertaining to practical trade-offs in 
budget allocation, enforcement, and administration. Network pricing for CBCP policy could be 
implemented in many ways. Since the cost of pricing all roads in a region with today’s technology 
is estimated to be prohibitively high, pricing only the major, congested corridors may be the most 
feasible implementation option, at least at the start. Roads that suffer from significant CBCP-related 
traffic spillovers also could be priced. The recommended policy is as follows:
A CBCP policy provides all eligible travelers with a travel budget to spend on congestion 
tolls using a transponder account linked to their names. Ideally, marginal cost pricing for delays 
induced by added road users would be imposed on all major congested roads, and the net revenues 
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would provide for these monthly travel budgets. Without system-wide roadway pricing, the optimal 
tolls will not reflect true marginal delay costs since many non-priced (yet congested) routes are 
still available between origins and destinations.  For efficient system operation, all complementary 
and substitute routes must be appropriately priced. Any budget not spent by the end of the month 
may or may not, depending on the chosen policy, serve as a cash savings or credit to the account 
holder. Those exceeding their budgets have to pay for any additional tolls out of pocket. Kalmanje 
and Kockelman (2004) provide estimates of total revenues and average travel budgets for a CBCP 
implementation in Austin. As originally conceived, the policy was meant to be revenue-neutral in 
that all revenues collected each month were to be distributed among all qualifying drivers in the 
region, after covering system administrative costs.  In practice, the actual chosen policy may differ. 
Returning cash to participants is an incentive for fraudulent activity (via ineligible persons claiming 
eligibility) that can be difficult and costly to regulate.  In light of expert caution and concerns 
regarding the administrative burdens of the originally conceived policy, several changes were made 
in constructing the final policy recommendations.
Toll Tags 
All system users should be able to obtain transponders for their vehicles upon paying a refundable 
deposit. Users of IH 15’s FasTrak lanes (in San Diego) and users of Dallas-Fort Worth toll roads 
presently pay a refundable deposit of $40 to obtain a transponder. However, if low-cost tags4 are 
used, the users could be asked to buy their own tags. The transponders will be associated with 
unique, vehicle-specific accounts5 that hold user data such as name, vehicle license plate number 
and/or a unique ID number, user address (available from vehicle registration records), and credit 
card information (required only if a user chooses to pay tolls using his/her credit card). Because 
travel credits/budgets are involved, CBCP involves more personal data collection than a CP 
application. Additional information could be stored based on the methodology adopted to identify 
people eligible for a travel budget. For example, if budgets are to vary as a function of corridor 
use such data could be kept.  In addition, budgets may only be granted when sufficient identifying 
information is presented, such as documents proving the vehicle is insured and registered in the 
region of CBCP application. 
Travel Budget Eligibility
One of the most difficult decisions and implementation issues associated with a CBCP policy is that 
of budget eligibility and distribution.  The two most likely criteria for eligibility are based on use of 
priced roadways and on location of residence. Both approaches have strengths and limitations – as 
well as several variations.  A user-based criterion (based on a minimum number of miles or days 
driven, for example) seems most relevant in a region where relatively few roadways are priced, so 
that those who really need the corridor are identified through use. A residence-based criterion works 
best when a well-defined region’s network is extensively priced; and residents of different locations 
may be eligible for different levels of travel budgets, depending on the expectation of need and/or 
contribution to the network’s provision (via property taxes, for example).
Different budget-eligibility criteria and their associated limitations were considered such as 
allocating budgets only to registered vehicle owners versus all licensed drivers in a region.  The 
potential for fraudulent representation of use and/or residence is what led to the strategy recommended 
here: travel budgets are best tied to a vehicle (based on its use or its registration address), rather than to 
an individual’s transponder (which can be shared easily with others). Drivers’ own transponders also 
can be read, in addition to vehicle identification tags, but that would require additional investment 
in technology. So the final recommendation is for transponders attached to vehicles. Only licensed 
vehicle owners with registered vehicles would be eligible for travel budgets. Individuals can be 
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asked to share their insurance records in order to become eligible for a travel budget, thus reducing 
incidence on uninsured motorists.
Those owning more than one vehicle would be eligible to receive only one travel budget. Of 
course, people could still register their vehicles under the names of licensed family members and 
others, and people might retain older and more polluting vehicles just to obtain additional budget. 
However, vehicle licensing, registration, insurance, inspection, and maintenance costs are likely to 
substantially exceed base travel budgets in most regions, particularly where revenues are largely 
reserved for use toward transportation system expansion and enhancement. It is unlikely that people 
would retain old polluting vehicles to obtain budgets since the cost of titling and registration would 
exceed the budget. 
Treatment of Visitors
Toll technology experts indicated that enforcement is usually not easy if both ETC users and non-
users use the same corridor. This could very well happen in a CBCP scenario since visitors (drivers) 
to the system may not have readable transponders.  One option is to let visitors drive for free. This 
would require the system to keep track of such vehicles (via ANPR) so that fines are not pursued. 
Ideally, visitors would be required to purchase a ‘day pass’ to use the priced corridors. Melbourne, 
Australia’s CityLink program has a similar daily pass option for its users (CityLink 2004). Visitors 
would be asked for their vehicle license plate information on purchase of a day pass, which could 
be bought online or at a roadside store as in London’s cordon toll application (Transport for London 
2008). Vehicles without transponders, which use the priced corridors, would be detected by ANPR. 
And vehicles tied to a purchased ‘day pass’ would be removed from the violator list at day’s end.
Budget Distribution 
In general, the same budget level may be granted to everyone. However, if equity is a key 
consideration, multiple budget levels may be useful. Budget levels could be based on employment 
status and household income. People with special needs could apply for a higher budget. If budget 
eligibility is determined by residence location then different packages/discount programs could be 
designed for people residing outside the CBCP budget eligible zone. For example, users of SR91 
express lanes can opt for one of the four available account types: 91Express Club, Standard plan, 
Convenience plan, and Special access.  
It should also be noted that if eligible people receive their monthly budgets on the same day, 
choice behaviors regarding when to spend one’s travel budget could result in undesirable traffic 
patterns depending on time of the month. People might drive initially and then shift to transit as they 
run out of travel budget, creating a temporary high demand for transit services (and low demand for 
road space). To prevent such fluctuations, revenue distribution should be staggered.
Record Management
Every user would have an online account (updated daily) to access all charges, credits, and other 
account information. Tolls and any fines would be charged to users’ accounts and would be accessible 
(and contestable) online. If payment is not received within a certain grace period, the state police 
could issue a citation (as in the case of North Texas Tollway Authority’s Tolltag users in the Dallas-
Ft. Worth region). Use of pre-paid accounts and automatic deposit options can ensure balances 
remain positive.
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Credit Controls
As originally conceived, CBCP involves a monetary transaction (in the form of a travel budget that 
can be accumulated and used to purchase other goods) from the managing agency to all travelers 
including those without vehicles.  Such an approach provides a relatively strong incentive for fraud 
(where ineligible persons claim eligibility) – along with administrative burdens and significant 
enforcement costs. To avoid such issues the budget can be linked to locally registered (and 
insured) vehicles, and individuals would not be permitted to accumulate – or cash out – their travel 
budgets. 
By not returning all revenues in the form of cashable budget system, managers can retain a 
portion of revenues for alternative uses.  And, by keeping travel budgets low (relative to revenues) 
and tied only to registered and licensed vehicle owners, fraudulent representation of eligibility 
becomes less of an issue and more revenues become available for alternative uses. The uses most 
popular among experts surveyed are maintaining existing roads, adding capacity, and investing in 
alternate modes like transit.  Of course, a region’s stakeholders and policymakers can make their 
own determinations.  In some regions, transit subsidies may be most desirable; in others they could 
be new expanded bridges and removal of bottlenecks.
Cost Estimates
Estimates of initial investment and recurring costs are required to predict net revenues. The paper 
computes the one-time investment costs based on the cost estimates provided by USDOT. The North 
Texas Tollway Authority’s (NTTA) administrative expenditures for the financial year 2003 were 
used to estimate operations and management (O&M) costs for an Austin, Texas, CBCP. To assume 
that all freeways would be priced is conservative since not all freeways are congested. Austin has 
105 centerline miles of roadway (measured via the centerline) and 570 lane miles of freeways, which 
are the sum of centerline miles times number of lanes (USDOT 2000c), 55% of which are congested 
(Schrank and Lomax 2003) in that conditions do not allow travel at the posted speed limits of 60 
mph on freeways and 35 mph on major streets. The following analysis assumes that fully 75% of the 
Austin freeway network is priced, making it a conservative cost estimate.
Initial Costs
Two USDOT reports (USDOT 2000a and 2000b) give the range of costs for toll plaza equipment 
and toll administration equipment used here to estimate total initial costs. Assuming one toll plaza 
for every three miles (as suggested by toll technology experts) requires around 27 toll plazas. Since 
only one structure is assumed for all the lanes at any point, the estimate uses the higher USDOT 
estimate for mainline structure. Since there are multiple lanes at each plaza, 150 electronic toll 
readers are required (one reader per lane). Around 100 high-speed cameras would be required (one 
for every two lanes, to ensure violation detection (USDOT 2000a). It is expected that users would 
cover their transponder costs by purchasing the tags or by paying a deposit, as appropriate. 
As mentioned earlier, the latest transponders like eGoTM 2201 (TransCore 2002) cost less than 
$10 per tag. The initial cost is estimated to be $11.4 million (Table 2), which amounts to about $9 
per Austin resident. Readers should note that Austin’s MPO, the Capital Area MPO (CAMPO), 
recently approved a $2.2 billion toll road plan for the region. Initial CBCP cost estimated here for 
transponders (which represent 84% of all initial costs) should overlap with toll road plan costs. 
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Table 2: Initial Technology Cost Estimates for a CBCP Application in Austin, TX
One-time investment
Unit Cost 
Estimate No. of Units Total Cost
ETC structure $15,000 27 $405,000
ETC software 7,500 27 202,500
ETC readers 3,500 150 525,000
High speed cameras 7,500 100 750,000
Toll administration hardware 12,500 1 12,500
Toll administration software 60,000 1 60,000
Toll tags 10 945,500a 9,455,000
Total cost $11,410,000
a This is the number of vehicles in Austin, where average vehicle ownership is 1.81 vehicles 
per household (as taken from Austin’s travel survey of households) and the projected number 
of households for the year 2003 is 522,372 (United States Census of Population 2000). 
b All cost estimates are in constant 2003 US dollars.
Recurring Costs
Operating expenses for the NTTA (2003), New Jersey Turnpike Authority (2003), and San Joaquin 
Hills Transportation Corridor Agency (2003) were used to arrive at system costs of an ETC application 
in Austin. Table 3 shows the calculated expenses per lane mile. Depreciation and amortization 
expenses were excluded since they result from financing decisions. Manual toll collection costs, 
state police, snow removal, and toll-tag pre-payment expenses also are not included, since they are 
not recurring costs for an Austin CBCP application. 
Table 3: Recurring (Annual) Cost Estimates of Various ETC Projects
Toll Road Program
Operating 
Expenses
Lane-Miles of 
Toll Roads
Expenses per  
Lane-Mile
NTTA $32,553,600 313 $104,005
NJ Turnpike Authority $140,023,307 1,219 $114,867
San Joaquin Hills $9,530,000 108 $88,241
Since a CBCP application is very similar to a standard ETC application, its operating costs can 
be assumed to be comparable to ETC operating costs.  One major distinction arises from maintaining 
CBCP travel budget accounts. Maintaining such accounts involves creating and verifying budgets 
and an additional secure record keeping.  Thus, it involves personnel from the legal, audit, accounting 
and community affairs departments. Therefore, the corresponding NTTA expenses were doubled, 
resulting in a cost “cushion” of 9.1% over a regular ETC facility.
CBCP operating expenses per lane mile are estimated at $113,569 per year, or a total of 
$48.5 million for the Austin region annually. This corresponds to $38.10 per Austin resident. In 
comparison, Austin residents are estimated to experience an average annual congestion cost of $590 
(per resident), which includes delay and fuel costs on all congested roadways (Schrank and Lomax 
2003). The daily vehicle miles traveled on freeways and other major roads and the percentage of 
peak period person-trips that are congested (Schrank and Lomax 2003) were used to estimate that 
around 75% of the congestion costs in Austin are on freeways (assuming similar congestion levels 
on freeways and other traveled roadways). This is equal to $442.50 per Austin resident. The total 
cost per resident obtained by applying a capital recovery factor to the initial cost equals $39.30.6 
Annual investment of $39.30 per resident seems reasonable to address freeway congestion. These 
cost calculations appear to support the case for CBCP as a worthwhile congestion mitigation strategy 
in a region like Austin.
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CONCLUSIONS
Kalmanje and Kockelman (2004) first explored public perceptions of their original CBCP policy 
proposal, and Kalmanje and Kockelman (2004) examined that policy’s short-term traffic and 
land value impacts for Austin, Texas. This paper synthesizes stakeholders’ and experts’ opinions 
and predictions of long-term system impacts to produce recommendations for a further refined 
CBCP policy. Academicians and practitioners in the field of transport economics, policymakers, 
administrators, and commercial users provided valuable feedback on issues of travel budget 
allocation, equity, efficiency, land use change, economic impacts, and alternative revenue uses. Toll 
technology experts provided recommendations for ETC technology (RFID and ANPR), system 
configuration, dynamic pricing issues, and variable message signs. 
The revised CBCP policy proposal and associated implementation strategies aim to address 
stakeholders’ and experts’ concerns relating to the original policy proposal, including ease of 
implementation and use of revenues.  Instead of offering cash credits to all licensed drivers in a 
“region,” it proposes travel credits only for registered vehicle owners. Political atmosphere and 
financial constraints may govern if cash out will actually be allowed. Travelers with special needs 
can apply for additional travel credits, and net revenues can be reinvested in the transportation 
system. Strategies to deal with issues such as budget eligibility, visitors, enforcement, and toll 
collection are outlined. The paper concludes that RFID tags and ANPR may be the most appropriate 
technologies for implementation.
The study estimated conservative costs (including initial and recurring costs) for a CBCP 
policy implementation along Austin freeways to be about $40 per resident when annualized.  Given 
Austin’s current modest congestion levels (relative to larger and denser metropolitan areas), the 
CBCP policy may not be appropriate for widespread application. However, its application at key 
bottleneck points, such as bridges using low-cost vehicle ID tags may make the most sense. CBCP 
can be a valid option for cities looking for a viable strategy to implement CP. Regions with extensive, 
congested transit systems may also want to examine CBCP for their road networks.
Building such a novel proposal from its theoretical foundation to everyday practice can face 
considerable challenges.  This work strives to advance the concept and address the hurdles that can 
be anticipated.  One of the strengths of CBCP is its flexibility.  More congested systems may want to 
retain substantial portions of CBCP revenues for system enhancement.  Smaller communities may 
opt for cashable credits rather than travel credits that expire each month.  CBCP in its current form 
has been galvanized by expert perspectives and is now a feasible demand management strategy.  It 
can help tackle the problem of congestion in an economically viable, equitable, and efficient fashion 
and, as such, is a powerful idea with significant potential.  This paper will hopefully assist experts’ 
efforts to make that potential a reality.  
Endnotes
Of course, such a “cost” depends on the traveler’s value of time, so CBD access actually should 1. 
become less expensive for those who are willing to pay to avoid delays.
HB3588’s Chapter 227 Sec. 370.174 describes the use of surplus revenue, to reduce tolls, assist 2. 
in other local transportation projects, and/or deposit into the State’s Mobility Fund. 
E.g. London VES errors arose from the similarity of letter O and number 0. 3. 
E.g. the eGo4. TM 2201 (TransCore 2002) costs less than $10 per tag. 
An individual cannot have more than one account. 5. 
17
Credit-Based Congestion Pricing
This is calculated at an interest rate of 6% over a period of 10 years, the lifetime of the ETC 6. 
system. 
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